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A visual image can be described by its temporal as
well as spatial properties. A recent study of the
asynchronous colour and motion perception has led
to a new view of perceptual synchronisation, in
which the temporal structures of events in the
external world provide a general explanation of how
events are bound or misbound in time.
The history of the study of visual perception is largely
the story of how the brain computes the identity,
movement and location of objects in space, and how
this information interacts or drives action [1]. The
shorthand of some of the most influential theories
reflects this in dichotomies such as ‘where’ and ‘what’
[2] or ‘what’ and ‘how’ [3], and in theories of attribute
specialisation [4]. The question of when events occur
in the world, however — although first asked as early
as those about objects and space [5] — has had less
impact in studies of perception. Anyone who has
observed visual illusions in psychology textbooks or
carefully followed one’s confused eyes along the con-
tours of an Escher painting would be comfortable with
the idea that visual perception does not always accu-
rately reflect the real world — what we see is not simply
what our eyes get [6,7]. But it is more difficult to see
how this applies intuitively to the time domain: yet
when we see is not a simple matter of when events
occur in the world.
The problem is not trivial. As I look across a hotel
lobby I see a large man in a red coat and yellow pants
walking slowly towards the breakfast bar. I see his
various visual attributes synchronously: his size,
shape and colours are perceptually bound in space
and time. The neurons that are most likely to be
responding to these different aspects of my unwitting
subject are widely distributed across several regions
of visual cortex, including areas V4, V5, TEO, posterior
parietal cortex and frontal eye fields. The question is,
given the widely distributed encoding of this man’s
attributes, how do I perceive all the elements bound
together in time?
Several recent experiments [8–11] have suggested
that temporal synchronisation of visual events occurs
as a function of the way the brain areas that encode
the attributes in question are anatomically segre-
gated. In this ‘functional specialisation’ view, one is
aware of things in the order the brain analyses or
responds to them. Moutoussis and Zeki [8], for
example, presented subjects with patterns of moving
squares that alternated in colour between red and
green, and changed direction between moving up
and moving down. When subjects were asked to
judge the colour of an object moving in one of these
two directions, the colour change had to lag behind
the direction change by about 80 msec for accurate
judgement of colour and motion direction. The
authors concluded that “a particular colour and a
direction of motion that occurred simultaneously in
real time are perceived separately and at different
times”. So why didn’t the hotel guest’s yellow pants
appear to reach the breakfast bar before him?
The beginnings of an answer lie in a comprehensive
paper published recently in Current Biology [12],
which re-examines the explanation for colour and
motion asynchronies based on functional specialisa-
tion by taking into account perceptual and behav-
ioural factors, and offers an alternative explanation.
Nishida and Johnston [12] first showed that the asyn-
chronous effect is replicable, but that it is only a
special case dependent on the stimulus conditions
used. If the changes in colour and motion alternate
every 250 msec, colour changes need to lag the
direction change by somewhere in the order of 100
msec for synchronous changes to be perceived. As
the change rate slowed however, the asynchrony dis-
appeared. So the argument from functional speciali-
sation only explains events within a very small time
window, and is not a general explanation of percep-
tual integration in time.
Nishida and Johnston’s [12] second experiment
addressed the relationship between the reported
asynchronies and manual response times, which have
been used as the dependent variable in some studies.
When subjects were asked to make button press
responses to a particular colour or direction of motion
there was no difference between responses to the two
attributes. When asked to report the colour of a target
direction, however, performance was optimal if the
colour was presented around 80 msec after the direc-
tion onset. And if the motion direction of a prespeci-
fied colour was the target, subjects performed best
when the direction onset preceded the colour by
approximately 100 msec. The point to be made here is
that the response times to single attributes — colour
or motion — do not predict the responses to dual
attribute targets: if the functional specialisation view
held, this would not be the case.
The first experiment shows that temporal asyn-
chrony is a special case dependent on a particular
range of alternation rates. In a third experiment, the
possibility that what one sees depends on how one is
interacting with the stimulus was addressed. Here
subjects were asked to hold down a button press for
the downward-moving phase of a stimulus alternating
in colour and direction. In keeping with the functional
specialisation argument, subjects judged direction
changes to lag colour changes by 100 msec. Again,
however, it was shown that this was a special case of
the task being used. When subjects were asked to
track the up and down phases of movement with a
computer mouse, there was no apparent delay. So,
the reported perceptual asynchronies of colour and
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motion occupy specific time and task domains that
preclude an explanation based on neural response
times to the individual attributes. Why, then, do the
asynchronies occur at all? It is important to note that
the functional specialisation view is also one of
chronometric correspondence, as it argues that the
brain “does not have a mechanism to compensate for
perceptual time differences” and also argues against
the existence of a final area equipped with a ‘syn-
chroniser’ [8] — when a specialised cortical area
responds determines when one perceives. In this
view, the temporal responses of the brain determine
the timing of perception.
The alternative proposed by Nishida and Johnston
[12] is that it is the temporal structure of the stimuli
that determines perceptual (a)synchronies. Here, the
when of perception is returned to the external world.
Consider how one would determine that the colour of
an object on a screen had changed. The object need
only be sampled at two points in time: if the colour at
time 1 differs from that at time 2, the change can be
registered. Now consider a direction change. The
locations of an object at time 1 and time 2, if different,
are sufficient to determine that the object is moving in
a particular direction. To detect a change in direction,
however, requires a third location which is not a point
that can be reached by continuing a line from the
locations at times 1 and 2. The terms given to this
two-point sufficiency and three-point necessity are
‘transitions’, or first-order change, and ‘turning points’,
or second-order change, respectively. The perception
of colour and direction changes depends on matching
sampling points in time from the stream of inputs to
the neurons representing each attribute. 
You may have tried to match a two-sample tempo-
ral process with a three-sample one at a fairground, if
you have ever tried to shoot smart ducks on the rifle
range. Smart ducks do not obligingly swim from left to
right, they move left–right and right–left unpredictably,
so that aiming is inaccurate when the duck changes
direction after a shot is taken. The visual system is
similarly fooled when it has to match events taken
from arrays of two samples with events taken 
from arrays of three samples. When the arrays are
filled quickly (fast alternations), the match is difficult 
and errors are highly probable — hence temporal
asynchronies. When the arrays are filled slowly, the
correspondence is easier and synchrony is more
likely. Which smart ducks would you want to shoot —
fast-moving or slow-moving ones?
To test their temporal matching theory, Nishida and
Johnston [12] created a three-sample (turning point)
task for colour and a two-sample (transition) task for
motion. Stimuli gradually changed from red to grey
and grey to red to give the colour axis a direction and
thus a turning point. The location of the stimuli could
be changed abruptly to give a transition akin to the
abrupt colour changes of the earlier experiments.
When the temporal structure arrays to be matched
were either both two-sample arrays or three-sample
arrays, Nishida and Johnston [12] predicted that there
would be no perceptual asynchrony; the functional
specialisation hypothesis, on the other hand, would
predict colour–motion asynchronies in both condi-
tions. Critically, when the stimulus consists of a three-
sample colour array and a two-sample motion array,
the new explanation predicts a complete reversal of
the colour–motion asynchronies reported in previous
studies. The results did not favour either hypothesis
entirely: there tended to be a residual need for motion
to precede colour for synchronous perception, but a
colour turning point and a motion transition did
abolish the asynchrony.
The idea that perception of the temporal order of
events is a simple function of when the neurons that
prefer a particular attribute respond seems untenable
in the face of the experiments described by Nishida
and Johnston [12]. Indeed, the idea that where an
attribute is processed may be the determining factor
of temporal perception does not address temporal
interactions within and between the separate cortical
areas. The proposed replacement, although account-
ing for a wider range of conditions, also gives an
incomplete description of perceptual (a)synchronies.
But the new hypothesis invites investigation into the
role of stimulus salience in matching time points in
information arrays: colour and luminance, for example
are very salient and often take primacy in figure
ground segregation, so it would be interesting to see
the changes matched for perceptual salience in future
experiments. As far as I am aware, the probability of a
particular attribute change has not been manipulated
in these investigations. And the big salient guy at the
breakfast bar? Perceptually, I thought the buns’ dis-
appearance was simultaneous with his arrival.
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